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HOW A 11.,REE PEOPLE

CONDUCT A LONG WAR:
A

BY

CHARLES J. STILLE.
"History, if it be not the merest toy, the idlest pastime of our vacant hours,
is the 1·ecol'd of the onwnrd march of Humanity towards an end. Where there
is no belief in such an end, and therefore no advance towards it, no stirrings of
a Divine "\Vord in a people's bosom, where not as yet the beast's hea1·t has been
taken away, and a man's heart given, there history cannot be said to be. They
belong not, therefore, to History, least of all to sacred llistory, those Babels,
those cities of confusion, those huge pens, into which by force and fraud, tho
early hunters of men, the Nimrods aud the Sesostrises drave, and compelled
their follows: and Scripture is only most trne to its idea while it passes them
almost or wholly in silence by, while it lingers rather on the plains of :Mamre
with the man that 'believed Ood ancl it was co1mted unto him for righteousness,' than by 'populous No' or great Babylon, where no faith existed but in
the blind powe1·a of nature, and the brute forces of the natural man."
TRY-~on's lluLSEA~ LECTURB,

The Utiity of Scripture.

NEW YORK:
ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH,
No. 683 BROADWAY

1863.
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HOW A FREE PEOPLE

CONDUCT A LONG vVAR .

WE lrnve known hitherto in this country so little
of the actual realities of war on a grand scale, that
many are beginning to look upon the violent opposition to the Govemmeut, ancl the slowness of the progress of our arms, as sigm of hopeless discouragement. History, however, sho:vs us that these are the
inevitable incidents of all wars waged by a free people. This might be abundantly illustrated by many·
remarkable events in English history, from the days
of the great Rebellion down. through the campaigns
of the Prince of Orange and of Marlborough, to the
wars which grew out of the events of the French Revolution. \Var is always entered upon amillst a vast
deal of popular enthusiasm, which is utterly unreasoning. It is the universal voice of history, that such
enthusiasm is wholly unreliable in supporting the prolonged an<.1 manifold burdens which are inseparable
from eYery war waged on an extensive scale, and for a
long period. The popular idea of war is a speedy
and decisive Yictory and an immediate occupation of
the enemy's capital, followed by a treaty of peace by
which the object."3 of the war are permanently secured.
Nothing is revealed to the excited passions of the
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multitude, but dazzling visions of national glory, purchased by small privations, and the early and complete subjugation of their enemies. It is, therefore,
not unnatural that at the first re,·erse they should
yield at once to an unmanly depression, and, giving up
aU for lost, they should vent upon the Government for
its conduct of the war, and upon the army and its
generals for their failure to make their dreams of victory realitie!<, an abuse as unreasoning as was their
original enthusiasm.
Experience has taught the English people that the
progress of a war never fulfils the popular expectations; that altl10ugh victory may be assured at last to
patient and untiring vigor and energy in its prosecution, yet during the continuance of a long war, there
can be 110 well-founded hope of a uniform and constant
series of brilliant triumphs in the field, illustrating the
1)rofouncl wisdom of the policy of the Cabinet; that,
on the contrary, all war, even that which is most successful in the encl, consists rather in cheekered fortunes, of altemations of victory and clisa,.;ter, and that
its conduct is genera11y marked by what were evidently, when viewed in the light of experience, blunders so glaring in the policy a<lopted by the Government, or in the strategy of its generals, that the wonder is success was achieved at all. The Engli::,h have
thus been taught that the true characteristic of public
opinion, in its judgment of a war, should be, not so
much hopefulness or impatience of immediate results,
but rather a stern endurance-that King-quality of
heroic constancy which, rooted deep in a profound
conviction of the justice of the cause, supports a lofty
I
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public spirit equally well in the midst of temporary
cfoaster, and in the hour of assured triumph.
vVe have had no such experience here. Our people
are perhaps more easily excited by success, n.nd more
readily depressed by reverses, than the English, and it
is, therefore, worth while to consider how they carried
on war on n. large scale and for a protracted period.
It will be found, if we mistake not, that the denunciations of the Government, so common among us of late,
and the complaints of the inactivity of the army, have
their exact counterpart in the history of the progress
of all the wars in which England has been engaged
since the days of the great Rebellion. He who draws
consolation from the lessons of the past, will not, we
tbiuk, seek comfort in vain when he discovers that in
all those wars in ,vhich the Government and the army
ba,-e been so bitterly assailed, ( except that of the American Revolution,) England has at last been triumphant. It is worth while, then, to look into English
history to understand h~)W war is successfully carried
on, notwithstanding the obstacles which, owing to a
perverted public opinion, exist within the nation itself.
These difficulties, although they inhere in the very
nature of a free government, often prove, as we shall
see, rnore fruitful of embarrassment to the favorable
prosecution of a war, than the active operations of the
enemy.
We propose to illustrate the propositions which we
have ad"Vanced, by a study of the series of campaigns
known in English history as the Peninsular War. ..We
select this particular war because we think that in
many of its events, ancl in the policy which sustained
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it, there nre to be observed many important, almost
startling paralle}i-;ms with our present Rtruggle. "\Ve
have, of course, no refcrener to any similarity exi-;ting
in the p1-inciple which prodncell the two war,,, hut
rather to the striking rc,.;emhlanee in the molles auopted hy tlw two people for pro~ecuting war on a grand
scale, and for the vinclicn.tion of n principle reg:.mled
a.<1 of vit:11 importance hy them.
The Peninsnl:u· "\Yar, on the p~rt of England, a,, was
contende<l by the ministi-y during its progress, and as
is now universa1ly recog11i,:ecl, was a struggle not only
to maintain her comnwrcial supremac), ( which was
then, as it is now, her life,) hut also to protect her own
i:;oil from in,a-,ion by the French, hy trnn~ferring the
scene of conflict to distant Spain. The genc>ral purpose
of assisting the alliance against Napoleon seems al ways
to have heen a !mhordinate motive. It i"l now admitted by all historians, that upon "uccess in thk- war depended not only England's rank among nations, but
her vc1·y exi~tence a" :m indE>penclent people. The
war wa,; carried on for more than ffre year~, and on a
scale, so far as tl1e umnher of nH'n and the extent of
the military operntions are concemed, until then wholly unattemptecl hy England in her European wars.
The resnlt, as it need not be Raid, was not only to
crown the British armR with the most brilliant and undying lustre, but also to retain permanently in their
places the party whose only title to public f:wor was
that they had carried on the war against the most serious obstacles, ancl brought it to :i successful tennination. Thus was delayed, it may he remarked, for at
least twenty year:-, the a<loption of those measures of
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reform which at last gave to Englancl that place in
modern ci ,·ilization which had long before been reached by most of the nations of tbc Continent by passing
through the trials of a bloody revolution. If we, then,
in our dark hours, are inclined to doubt and despondency as to the final result, let us not forget the ordeal
through which England successfully passe<l. vVe shall
fincl that, in the commencement, there was the same
wild an<l unreasoning enthusiasm with which we are
familiar; the same bitter abuse and denunciation of the
Government at the first reverses; the same impatient
and ignorant criticism of military operations; the same
factious and disloyal opposition on the part of a powerful party; the same discouragement and despondency at times on the part of the true and loyal ; the
same prophecies of the utter hopelessness of success ;
the same complaints of grievous and burdensome taxation, and predictions of the utter financial ruin of the
country; the same violent attacks upon the Government for its arbitrary decrees1 and particularly for the
suspension of the writ of liabea-s corpus; the same
difficulties arising from the inexperience of the army;
and the same weakness on the part of the Govemment
in not boldly and energetically supporting the army in
the field. These arc some of the more striking parallelisms between the Peninsular War and our own
struggle, which a slight sketch of the progress of that
war will render very apparent.
The insurrection in Spain which followed immediately upon a knowledge of the intrigues of Napoleon
at Bayonne, in April, 1807, by which the royal family
was entrapped into an abdication of its rights to the
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throne, and Joseph Bonaparte made king of that country, roused univer:sal admiration aud enthusiasm in
England. It was thought by all parties that an obstacle to the further progress of ...T apoleon's schemes of
the mo,-t formidable character lrnd at last been found.
It was the first popular in urrection in any country
against 1 apoleon's power, and consequently, when the
deputies from the Asturias reached England imploring
succor, their appeals excited the popular feeling to tho
highest pitch, and the oppo~ite parties in Parliament
and the country vied with each other in demanding
that England shoulcl aid the insurrection with the
whole of her military power. It is curious to observe,
that when the question of aid was brought before Parliament, Mr. Canning and 1\fr. Sheridan, who had probably never acted together before on any political que:f
tion, rivalled each other in their praise of the Spaniard~, and in their expressions of hope and belief that
Napoleon had at lust taken a step which would !ipeeclily prove fatal to him. Large supplies were votecl by
accla.mation, and an important expe<lition, afterwards
operating in two columnc;, one under the command of
Sir John Moore, the other under that of Sir Arthur
Wellesley, was dispatched to the Peninsula. to aid the
insurgents. It is not our pul'pose to trace the progress
of this expedition, but merely to notice the effect which
its immediate results, the retreat to Corunun, and the
Convention of Cintra, produced upon popular fef'ling
in England. As we look back on the history of that
time, the folly and madness which seized upon the popular mind when the terms of the Convention of Cintra
becnme known, can only be explained by recalling the
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high-wrought an<l. extra,·agant expectations of immediate success with which the war had been entered upon.
By this Convention, and as the results of a single batr
tle, Portugal was wholly e,·acuatecl by the French; yet
such were the unreasonable demands of public opinion,
that because the whole French army had not been
made prisoners of war, the .Ministry was almost swept
away by the outburst, and it coukl only control the
storm by removing the two generals highest in rank.
It requireJ all the family an<l political influence of the
thin], Sir Arthur \Vellesley, to enable him to retain
his position in the army. The disastrous retreat of
Sir John :Moore's army to Corunna, and the easy triumphs of the French at that period tbrougbout all
Spain, plunged the English into despair. Going from
one extreme to another, men who, only three months
before, bad quarrelled with the army in Portugal because it had not given them the spectacle of a French
marshal ancl twenty thousand of his soldiers as prisoners of war at Spithead, now spoke openly of the folly
of any attempt at all on the part of the English to resist the progress of the French arms in the Peninsula.
In Parliament there ·was the usual Jame apology for
disaster, an attempt to shift the responsibility from the
:Ministry to the Ge11eral in comman<l ; but the great
fact, that all their hopes had been disappointed still
remaineJ, and after the explanations of the GoYernment the general despondency became more gloomy
than ever. It is not difficult in the light of history to
see where the blame of failure should rest. Any one
who is disposeJ now to sneer and cavil at the shortcomings of our own administration, to impute to it
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view;; short-sighted and impracticn.hle in their policy,
and to hlmne it for want of energy and vigor in the
pro:;ecntion of the war, has only to tum to Colonel
N apil'r':-; account of the stupid hlunclcr:i of the Engfah
gov ·rntnC'nt, it..; ah,-urcl ancl contra 1ictory ord{'J~, its
absolute ignorance not only of the elementary principles of nll war, but of the vny nature of the country
in which the nrmy was to operate, an<l of the re~om·ces
of the memy, to he conYincecl tba.t lrn<l its mode of
carrying on hostilities, (which was tho popu1ar one,)
been adopted, in six mouths not an English soldier
wonlcl have remained in tho Peninsula excE>pt as a
prisoner of war. The history of this campaign contains important lessons for us; it shows conclusi,,ely
that the immediate result~ of war arc never equal to
the pnhlic expectation, ancl that if this public expectation, defeated hy the imbecility of the Government, or
soured by disaster in the nelc1, is to he the sole rule by
which military operations are to be judged, no war for
the defence of a principle can long he carriecl on.
Fortunately for the fame and the power of England,
the ~Iinistry, although ignorant of the true mode of
prosecutmg hostilities, had sense enough to pE>rcei-ve
that thefr only trne policy was pel':-everance. They
were strong enough to resist the formidable opposition
which the e,-ents we haYc refened to deYeloped in
Parliament and the country, and, mH1isniayed hy the
experience of tho past, concluded a treaty with the
Provisional Government of Spain, hy whid1 they
pledged England ne,er to abandon the national cause
until tbo French were driven ncro::;s the Pyrenees. The
army was placed upon a better footing, was largely re
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inforced, and Sir Arthur ,vellesley was a.ppointed to
the chief comma.ncl. The Go,·ernment, not yet wholly
awakened from its illusions, still thought it practicable
to reach Madrid in a single campaign, and to that end
the efforts of \Ycllington were directed. It became
necessary first to dislodge Soult at Oporto, and the
magnificent victory of the English, gained by the pas•
sage of the Douro at that point, went fa,r to re,·ive
con:ficlence at home in the invincibility of their a,nuy.
Yet so clear is it that victory in war often depends
upou what, for some hetter name, we rna.y ca11 mere
goocl fol'tune, that we have the authority of tbe Duke
of Welliugton himself for saying, that this army,
which had just exhibited such prodigies of valor, wns
then in such a state of demoralization, that although
"excellent. on parade, excellent to :fight, it was worse
than an enemy in a country, and liable to dissolution
alike by success or defea.t." Certainly no se,·erer criticism has ever been justified by the inexperience and
want of di:c:cipline of our own ra,v levies than that
contained in this memorable declaration. A little reflection and candor might teach us, as it did the English, that nothing can compensate for the want of experience, and that every allowance is to be made for disasters where it is necessary to educate both officers and
soldiers in the actual presence of the enemy. \Vellington soon afterwards moved towards the Spanish frontier, hoping by a junction with the army under Cuesta
to fight a battle with the French, which would open to
him the road to the capital. The battle was fought at
Talavera, and although it has since been claimed by
the English as one of their proudest victories, and the
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name of TALAVERA is now inscribed upon the standards of the regiments who took pa1t in it with those
of Salamanca and Vittoria, yet the 1·esult was in the
eud, that . Wellington was ohlige<l to retreat to Lisbon,
just three months after he had set out from that place,
haYing left his wounded in the hancls of the French,
having escapc<l as if by a miracle from being wholly
cut off in his retreat, and lrn.ving lost one-third of hi'3
army in lnittle and by disease. Of course, the blame
was thrnwn upon the ,vant of cooperation on the part
of the Spaniards. This we have nothing to do with ;
it is the result of the campaign with which we are concerned. Dependence upon the Spaniards was certainly, as it turned out, a fault, but it was one of the fair
chances of war, and it was a fault in which '\Vellington, made wise by experience, was never again detected.
·when the news of the untoward result of this campaign reached England, the clamor against the GoYernment and against ,Vellington was quite as violent
as that excited by the disasters of Sir John Moore's
army. The opposition in Parliament took a<lvantage
of this feeling to rouse public opinion to such a maniifestation as might compel the termination of the war
in the Peninsula, and drive the Ministry from office.
The Common Council of London, probably a fair exponent of the opinions of tlie mi<lcUe class, petitioned the King not to confirm the grant of £2,000
year, which the Ministry had succeeded in getting Parliament to vote to \Vel1ington. The petitioners ridiculed the idea that a battle attended with such results
should be called a victory. "It should rather be called
a calamity," they said, "siuce we were obliged to seek
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safety in a precipitate flight, abandoning many thousands of our wounded countrymen into the l1and1:, of
the French." In the opinion of the strategists in the
Common Council and of their friends in Par1iament,
Wellington might be n. brave officer, but he was no
general ; he hacl neglected the protection of his flanks
and. his line of communication. "\Vhen it is remembered, that at this very time, vVelliugton, profiting by the
experience of tbe past, wac_; L1iligently making his army
really effective within the lines of Torres Vedra.$, from
which stronghold it was in due time to sa1ly forth like
a giant refreshed, never to rest until it had planted the
Eug1ish flag on the heights of Toulouse, we may perhaps smile at the presumption of those who, sincere
well-wishers to the cause, displayed on1y their ignorance in tlieir criticism. But what shall be said of
those who, knowing better, being quite able to understand the ,:visdom of the policy adopted by the General to insure success in the stupendous euterpl'ise in
which the country was engaged, yet with a factious
spirit1 and with the sole object of getting into power
themselves, took advantage of the excitement of the
ignorant multitude to paralyze the energies of the Government 1
That hideous moral leprosy, which seems to he the
sad but invariable attendant upon all political discussions in a free government, corrupting the very sources
of public life, breeding only the base spirit of faction,
hacl taken complete possession of the opposition, and
in its sordid calculations, the dishonor of the country,
or the danger of the army, was as nothing provided
the office, the power, and the patronage of the Govern-
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ment were i,ecurecl in their hands. It was of little
concem to them, pro,itletl they coul<l drive the Miui;;fry from office, whether it:-; downfall wa:,; hrou~ht al>0ut
hy hlnnders in Spain, or Ly the King's obstinacy
about Catholic Emancipation, or l>y an obscure quarrel
a.hout the influence of t11e Lol'(ls of the hed-chamher.
The ~incerity of thc:--e dtdamations of the opposition
was curiou:,}y enough put to the te::,t :,ome time after•
ward;:, when the )linistry, wc,ariecl hy tbe factious
demagognei-..m with which all thc·ir mem,mes were assailc(i, and nnderstanding pc1fectly their significance,
boldly challenged their opponent:-, if they were in
earnest, to make a definite motion in the House of
Common,, that Portugal sboul<l he ahandoned to its
fate. This mo,e completely unmasked their game,
and for a. time silenced the clamor, for it was perfectly understood on all hamls, that de<·p in the popular
heart, nndi-;turhed hy the storms which swept over its
smface, there was a thorough and abiding conviction
of the ahsolute necessity of re:-;isting the progress of
Napoleon's armc.., and that the real 1-iafrty of England
herself rcquiretl that that re.:sistanc<' bhouhl then be
made in Spain. Still thi;; noi:,,y clamor dicl immense
mischief; it weakened the Go,~emment, it prolonged
the strife, it alarmed the timid, it discoumged the true,
and it so far impo:-;ed upon Napoleon himself, that thinking that in tlwse angry invectives against the Government he found the real exponent of English sentiment,
be concluded, not unnatnrally, that the people were
tiretl and di,-gustetl with the war, antl that the priva•
tions which it occasioned were like a cance1·, slowly but
sorely eating out tho sources of national lifo.
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In the midst of the"e Yio1cnt tumults at h ome,

W ellington was Rilently preparing for hi:; grc::i.t work
within the lines of Tol'l'C~ V etlra,. It wouhl not ho
ea-<y to OYCJTate the difticnlties hy which be was surronmlcd. Ile was fully aware of tho outcry whid1
b:1<1 been raised against him; he knew that from a
Cabinet wcnkencd hy intemal (li...sension:-, autl on the
verge of O'\"erthrow from the Yigorou~ assault:'! of the
opposition, aml from its own unpopularity occasioned hy
the failure of the vValchercn expe1lition, and the disasters
in the Penin-.;ula, he could expeut no thorough and reliable support. Indeed, the Gon~mment, almo.-;~ in dC'spair, threw the whole responsi bi1ity for the milita1·y measures on the Continent on him alone. Ile accepted
the rcsponsihility in a mo.st magnanimous spirit. "I
conceive," he write", "that the honor and the intere:,;td
of the conntry require that we shonhl hohl om· po:-ition here a.<i long as po,--<ible, and please Goel, I will
mainfain it as long as I can. I will neither <•n lcavor
to shift from my own shonlderl:! on those of the l\Iini,,;ters the re),ponsihility for the failure, hy calling for
mcam which I know they cannot give, and which perhaps woukl not achl matcl'ially to the facility of attaining our ohjcct; UOI' will I gi,e to the l\Iini-..tcr,-., who
arc not strong, and who mu,,t feel the clclicacy of their
own situation, an excuse for withdl'awing the army
from a po-;ition which in my opinion, the honor an<l.
interest of the country require they should maintain
as long as possibl('." .A.nimatccl by thi._ heroic sense
of duty, the Commander-in-Chief prep:wetl to contend
again~t the 200,000 men uncler Massena, whom Napoleon had sent to chase him into the sen. Ile had, to
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oppo.;c this immense force, only 2.3,000 English soldiers,
and nhout the same numbe>r of Portuguese, tolerahly
orgnniz<>tl. Secure within the lines of Torres Vedra-:;,
he quietly waited until the want of pro,~isionf:, and
the uttC'r hopelessne"-<: of an ac:,ault upon his po,-ition
forced npon l\fass('Jla tho nece:;sity of retreating. Then
instantly pu1~uing, in a series of battles, of almost
claily OC'Currcnce, he drove J\Ias-:cna out of Portugal,
alHl reached once more the Spanish frontier in )fay,
1811, 110arly three year:, after tho English had sent an
army to the as,-istancc of the Peninsula. Herc he
rested for a long time, making preparations for the
siege of Badajoz and Ciucla.<1 Rodrigo.
requiring time, and the success of which was e,-sential
to the safety of the army in it-, further progrc..;'l. Still,
so little was ellington':-i por-1ition, military an<l political, understood in England, eYen at that time, after all
the proofs he hucl given of c·onsnmmute ability, that
public clamor was again roused against the mode
adopted by him for conducting the war. As there
were no cli--asters nt which to grumble, people talkecl
of "ha?Ten victories," hecau<;e like tho~e of Crecy and
Azincourt, they brought no territorial acqui,-itions, forgetting then what they have never been weary of
houstiugly proclaiming since, that these victories were
tho be,,t proof-s that their army was di~tingui-;bed by
the highest military qnalitie~, whicl1, properly directed
ancl supported, were capable of achieving the most
glorious re~ults. So profound was the conviction of
the immense superiority of the French, both in numbers ancl in the quality of their troops, that the puhlic
miml was in a state of feverish anxiety, and many

,v
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of the stoutest hearts gave way to despair. About
thi-; period Sir "\Yalter cott wrote to
Ellis :
'·The=-" cursecl, double emsecl nC'ws (from Spnin)
b:we sunk my 1,pirit~ 80 mnch, that I am almost at <lishelieYing ii Pro,·idence; God forgi,·e me, but I think
!:!Otne c,·il demon has heen permitted in the shape of
thi~ tyrannical monster, whom Goel ha-. Rent on the
n:itions n,;ite<l. in his anger. The ),pring-tide may, for
anght I kno"', hreak upon 11.s- in the next !':e<-'4ion of
P:1rliament. There is an evil fate upon us in all we clo
at home or abroad." So Sir Jame~ )fockinto,;h, writing to Gentz, at Vienna: " I believe, like yon, in a
resurrection, because I helie,·e in the immortality of
ch·ilization, but when, and by whom, and in what
form, are questions which I have not the Ei:tga<'ity to
answer, and on which it would be 1,olclness to hazard
a conjecture. A dark :mc..1 stormy nigllt, a hlack series
of nge;; may be prepar<'cl for our po...terity, hefore the
dnwn that opens the more perfoct day. \Vho can tell
bow long that fearful night may he hcforc the dawn
of a brighter morrow ? The ra'.!e of man may reach
th<' promisecl land; hut there i.., no assurance that the
present generntion will not peri,;h in the wilderness."
As if to render the situation more gloomy, if po,---ible,
the :Marquis of "\Vellesley, the hrother of "\Vellington,
left the .Ministry upon the aYowetl groun<l that the
GoYernment would not support the war with sufficient
vigor. llistory has stl'ipped his con<lnct of any such
worthy motive, and shown that the real trouble was
his anxiety to supplant )fr. Perceval At the same
time, the attack was kept up in the opposite quarter.
"No man in his senses," said Sir Frnncis Bnr<lett,

.,fr.
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"could entertain a hope of the final succcs::. of onr
arms in the Peninsula. Our hurels were great, hnt
harren, aud our Yictorics in their effects mere defeats.,,
1\fr. "\Vhit hrend, too, as usual, was not bchinclhand with
hi-; proplicci<'~. "Ile saw no reason," he snitl," to alter
his Yit-w:,; respecting pe:tc..'; w'lr mn,-t othc•·wise tcrn1inate in the :-ulijugation of either of the conteudiug
powers. They were l)oth great; hut this was a <·ountry of factitiou'3 grcatnes,;. France was a country of
natnrnl greatncs,;." So, Gem'ral TarlC'ton "hacl the
doctrine of Mr. Fox in his t~wor, who wi,=;hed for the
pen<'il of a CerY:mtes to lie al,le to ridicule those who
desired to enter upon a conti1wntal war.11 •=:•
Thu..:, from uniYcrsal c·nthusia..m in f,wor of tl1e
Rpani,-h war, public opinion, at fli-st mn11ifo,ti11g itself
through the factious spirit of the oppo;;ition, at length
spoke through all its org,m,;,, in tones of de:-pondency
• The following des~riplion t,f the oppo•ition of tlint dny, takton from the
fio ,triking 11 lik,·!le<s to thP p1·culi,1riti~'S of the
lcad~rs of an iu.significnnt, but re..tlcss faction 01 100~ u•. thnt, omittin~ the olc.l,
fa-bionetl drnpt·ry of tlw proper numce, tlwy seem In hnve s,1t for the photograph. " lt mny be rm,arkcd a• n mo-t ,in:;ulnr circum,tnnee, thn tho,P, JWrsons in this country wlin profe,s lo 11:1,·c Ilic gn•ut('•! abhorn·n e nf ministcrinl
tyranny nnd opprcs,ion, look with thu utmost coolnc,s on tht• tyrnnny nnd OJ>·
pre•sion of D,mal'llr!P. The regular oppo,ition <lo not nwntion it with that nbhorr1•uC<' "hic·h might be cx1wct1•d from tlicm; but the lc•ndc1·~ of the popular
pnrty in l'nrlinment go further. They arc nlrno-t alwny ready to find nn excu•e for the conduct ot Ilonaparlc. The most ,·iolPnt and unjustifinblc net~ of
his tyranny raise but feeble incl1!,(nation in thdr mind,, whilt the 1110,t lriflin~
a1·t of minis:eri:11 oppres ion is invei::lwd oi.,..,.in•t "ith the utmost bitternc,R.
Ready and un,usp<·clin~ credence is ~h·en to enry ncwunt of Bonnpnrtc's sueccss; while the acto1mb of thll ,ucce- of his o; J>Onents nre reccin·d "ith cold1,es, nnd di,tru,t. Wero it n•>t for these things. the conduct of lllr. Whitbrend
nnd his friend'! would be hniled with more i;atisfaction, and in-pire more confi•
dence with the re~I Ionrs of thdr country; for they dc•ervc nmple credit for
th•• undaunted antl unw1•nried firmnes~ with which they h:n-e set thcm•eln,s
n:;:iinst abuses and n,,....,.in,t every inst:111ce of opprcs.,ion."
..,i,11111"1 /,'·,'lis1,.,. for Jill~. bears
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and de,;pair, of the situation and prospects of the countrv. and :;imply hecau<;e there had not been that sort
of ~nilita1·y bUccess which it could un<ler:;taml, to sustain and 1lir~ct it. Univer:ial distrust seized upon the
puhlic min<l; and had it not heen for the heroic constancy of that great commander, whose task in supporting the iiinistry at home was at least as difficult as that
of beating the French in Spain, the glory of England
had <;uuk for eyer.
Yet it happt•ncd, as it so often lt:1ppens in the order
of Divine ProYiclcncr, in the moral as in the pl1ysical
wor'd, tl,at the night was darke::.-t ju,-t 1,eforc dawn.
Ami11st all this uuiver~al de,-pondency and sini'lter forehodiug, events we1·c preparing which in a fow Hhort
month~ changed the whole foce of Europe, and forced
l>ack that torrent of reYolutionary
which had
spread o,·er th<.' whole continent, until it o,·erwhclmed
the country where it had its source in complete ruin.
The t1i.~cu,-,-iJ1:s in Parli:mwnt to ,rhich we h:we refeJTetl,
took plilce in February, 181:2. '\Yith the sieg(' of Ciuda<l Rodrigo on the 18th of Janual'y of that year, with
the foll of Ihdajo,i on the 26th of Mal'ch, the first battle of S:tbmanca 011 the 20th of July, and Napoleon's
invasion of Rn-;--ia in June in the ~ame yem·, heg.m the
downfall of the French Empil'c.
·wellingtou at Inst reaclwd .:\Iadrid in Angu"t, 1812,
more thaa four year:; later than he ougLt to haYe done,
accorcling to the i--trntcgi:-:t~ of J>arliamcnt and the Pre,-_-:_
Thi!) wa-; all forgotten nt the moment, :-o magic a wand
i:s hel<l by succe,-,-.. The fickle voice of popnl:11· applan--e \\ a<. ag,tin h<.'ar<l, echoing the spirit of conti,lence
which his persi~tcut and und.nmtecl con<luct hall re-

20

now

A FREE PEOPLE

vived in the hearts of his countrymen. His career of
victory, however, was destined not to be unchecked;
ancl when, after bis occupation of Madrid, bis unsuccessful assault 11pon the Castle of Burgos rendered a
retreat to the Portuguese frontier and the evacuation
of the capital a proper military movement, although
that retreat was compensated for by the abandonment
of Andalusia by the French, in order to concentrate
their -whole force against him, still the blind multitude
coul<l not be made to understand it, and began again
to murmur.
It is not now difficult to see that the victory at Salamanca was really what the far-seeing sagacity of Marshal Soult predicted at the time it would become, "a
prodigious historical event," that it was the pivot on
which at that time hinged the destinies of England,
one of those battles of which we see perhaps a dozen
only in the whole course of history, which are really
decisive of the fate of empires. It completely unloosed
the French power in the Peninsula, and prepared the
way for the great success of Vittoria, the next year,
which gave the coup de grace to the French military
occupation of Spain. It is not our present purpose to
trace the history of the next campaign, but it is curious
to observe the effects produced by assured success upon
that public opinion which had shifted so often and so
strangely during the progress of this eventful struggle.
The opposition, as their only hope of escape from per
litical annihilation, and thinking to swim with the popular current, abused the ministers for not supporting
'\Vellingtou with sufficient earnestness, complaining that
they had taken the advice which they themselves bad
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so often ancl so eloquently tendered. But it was of no
arnil. This wretched charlatanism was too transparent
to impose upon any one; and of the great party who
opposed the war, no one ever after rose to office or
power in England. It r<'qnirecl a whole generation, in
the opinion of the English cou..tituencies, to expiate the
faults of those who had neered at the great Duke, and
hacl called the glorious fields of Vimefro, Busaco, T ala-vera, Fuentes <.rOnor, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz,
names which had become associated with the proudest
recollections of English renown, "mere bancu victories,
equal in their effects to defeats."
e pass now to the considE>ration of another class
of difficulties inherent in the prosecution of every war,
and generally of far greater magnitude than any other,
-those connected with the raising of the vast sums of
money required for the support of military operations.
Iu this important matter, if we mistake not, there are
some striking points of resemblance between the English experience <luring the war, and our present situation. I t is the fashion among many who seek to excite
the public alarm on this subject from unworthy, ancl
sometimes, it may be feared, from treac;onable motiYes,
to represent the enormous outlay of the nation's wealth
which is poured out to save the nation'i:; life, as wholly
unparalleled in histo1·y. Yet it may lJe as"erte<l, without any fear of contradiction, that England, with a population then little more than half of that which now
inhabits our loyal States, ,rith resources innnitely less
in proportion at that time than our own, her manufacturing industry, i,;o far as extemal outlet was concerned,
wholly crippled by the operation of the F'1·ench conti-

,v

22

IIOW' A FREE PEOPLE

uentnl ~ystcm, and her own 01·<lers in Conncil, expPnded, dm·ing every year of tbe Peninsular w:11'. as forge a
sum fl'.! has lwen required hero each year to create and
keep up tho gigantic force now iu nrms to put down
the Rebellion. During tbe five p•ai-s that. the war
]a-,tecl, her average annual expenditure exceeded ninety
millions of pounds sterling, or fou1· bn111lred and fifty
millions of do1lnr~, whit:h iR ahout the same snm which
is demnndNl of n:-. No one, of cou1-sE', preten<ls to say
that this rate of expenditure ii- not appalling, yet it
concerns us to know that it is not unprecedented, and
that these \·ast amount,::, have been raised from national
reRonrces fo1· infrrior to our own. It should not he forgotten, also, that they represent the money price of
England's in<lepr.ndence, and if ours is secure<l by a far
greater outlay, we certainly are not <li-1posed to quarrel
with the wisdom of tho investment.
Tho question il:l, how were these immense sums raised in England? The man who would have predided,
at tho commencement of the war with France, that the
English national debt would at it:-; close exceed one
thousand millions of pounds sterling, and that the
country would he able to bear such a burden, would
have l)een regarded as visionary, and as wilcl as he
who in this country, two) ears ago, might baYe foretold
the present amount of our national debt, and have contended that, in spite of it, the public credit would remain unimpaired. The difficulty in England of raising
these vast sums was tenfold greater than it is here.
Napoleon, looking upon England as the Southern people have been taught to regaru us, as a pmely commercial ·nation, undon btedly placed more reliance for sue-
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cess upon the instinct of money getting, which would
shrink from the pecuniary sacrifices 11ecessary in a pro.
longed struggle, tlrnn upon the mere victories of his
n.rmy. Hence he pursued, dUl'ing his whole career, an
inflexible purpose of n1ining English commerce, and
by a series of measm·es known as the Continental system, endeavored to exclude English ships and English
products from the markets of the world. The effect
of these measures, although not so serious as he wished
and had anticipated, nevertheless crippled enormously
the resources of England just at the period when they
were most needed.
Taking the three years before the issuing of the
Orders in Council, and the vigorous enforcement of the
Continental system, which were coincident in point of
time with the commencement of the Spanish war, the
average annual exports sank from fifty-seven millions
to twenty-three millions, taking the average of three
years after they had been in operation. Taxes were
laid on at a most burdensome rate. The income tax
was ten per cent., and besides, specific war taxes,
amounting to more than twenty millions a year was
imposed. Notwithstanding all these taxes, the debt
increased more than one thousand millions of dollars
during the Peninsular war. Discontent an<l violence
among the laboring classes became universal, ancl it
was remarked that the achievement of the greatest viotories in Spain was celebratecl in England "amidst a
population who had been prevented by the burden of
taxation on the absolute necessaries of life, from securing a livelihood by the strictest industry, and thus pauperism bad been generated throughout the land, a pau-
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peri"lm aggravated by a spirit of pillage, which it required a strong military force to repress." Bankruptcy
and ruin fell upon the trading cla,._e,::, and absolute exhaustion of the resources of the country seemed almo:.t
reached. The public stocks had sunk to such a degree
that the three per cents., which are now nlways above
90 per cent., were rarely higher dming the war than
65 per cent., and so depressecl at Inst had the public
credit beco1ne, that the last loan of the Continental
war, that of April, 1815, wac; taken by the contractor
at 53 per cent., and paid for in the depreciated paper
of the day; and yet the Chancellor of the Exchequer
was congratulated even by the opposition for having
made a "good operation." The Bank was in a state of
chronic suspension, the huying and selling of gold wore
prohibited to the pul)lic under severe penaltie-i, and
yet every gold guiuea which was sent by the government to the army in Spain (and nothing else would answer the purpose of money in that country) cost thirty
per cent. premium. How England survived nll this
complication of troubles is one of the marvel of history, but it is not our purpose to discuss that question.
The great fact that the money required was somehow
rnisecl is all that we have to do with at present. When
we have been at war for twenty years, aud are forced,
in order to raise the means of carrying it on, to su bruit
to one tithe of the sacrificel:! which were endnred by
the English, we may then perhaps begin seriously to
consider the money value of the Union.
The lesson which this review of the progress of the
Peninsular war tcache~, is, it seems to us, one of hope
and encourngement, for if it shows anything, it proves
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clearly that in the support of public opinion, and in
the means requisite to maintain a great army, those
fundamental essentials of real military success, om·
Government is immeasurably stronger than the English ever was at any pe1-iod of the war. It teaches
also another important lesson, and that is, that there is
such a thing as public opinion falsely so called, which
is noisy just in proportion as its real influence is narrow
and restricted. One of the most difficult and delicate
tasks of the statesman is to distinguish the true from
this false opinion, the factious demagogue from the
grumbling but sincere patriot, and to recognise with a
ready instinct the voice which comes from the depths
of the great heart of the people, in warning it may be
sometimes, in encouragement often, but always echoing
its abiding faith in the ultimate triumph of the good
cause.
vVe have confined ourselves in our illustrations to
the discussion of questions as they affected the success
of purely military operations, because we feel that here
our grand business is to clear away the obstacles, real
or fancied, which may in any way impair our military
efficiency. In military success alone, we are firmly convinced, is to be found the true solution of our whole
difficulty, the only force which can give vitality or permanence to any theory of settlement. & the matter
now stands, it is idle to hope for either peace or safety
until this question of military superiority is unmistakably and definitely settled. Upon this point, then, the
increase of our military efficiency, which embraces not
merely the improvement of the con<l.ition of the army,
but also, as we have endeavored to show by English

2G

now

A FREE PEOPLE

examples, and in a greater degree than is often supposed, the support of the Government in its general policy of conducting the mu·, should the efforts of all those
who influence public opinion be coucentrate<l.
There is a certain class of men among m,, not Yery
numerous, perl1aps, bnt still, owing to their position
and culture, of conside1·ahle influence, who, accustomed
to find in the European armies thei1· stamlard of military pfficiency, are disposed to <loubt whether a force,
composed as ours is of totally different materials, can
accomplish grent results. We may admit at once the
superiority of foreign military organization, the result
of the traditions of centuries of military expe1·ience,
digested into a thorough system, and carried out l>y
long trained officers perfectly versed in the details of
the service. Much inconvenience has necessarily re~
sulted in our case from the ignorance of R<-'gimental
Officers, to a greater degree probably, boweve1·, from
a want of proper care and attention on their part to
the troops when in camp, than from any grnss incompetency or misconduct on the field of battle. Instances
of such misconduct there have undoubtedly been, but,
considering the number of the officers and their want
of experience, those instances are extremely rare, and
when we call to mind the numhe1· of officers who have
fallen, while leading their men in l>attle, out of proportion, as it undoubtedly is, with the losses in other wars,
we may well palliate deficiencies in this respect, out of
considerations for their heroic g,1llantry and devotion.
We do not underrate certainly the value of good offi.
cers, but history tells us that great victories have been
achiHed by armies who were no better led than ou1'8.
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The incompe:ency of his officers was one of \Vellington's standing complaints in Spain. Most of them k1ww
absolutely nothing heyond the mere routine of gal'l'i:-on
duty; they were all what is technically called. "gentlemen," for each oue hn<l purcha.5ed his commission at a
high price, but they had bad no P.ystematic t1·aining in
militury $Chools; nearly all of them hau had no actual
expnience of war, and their average intelligence was
undoubtedly below that of the meu who hohl similar
positions in our army:::- All accounts agree tlrnt at that
period the scientific branches of the gl'eat art of war
were almost wholly neglected in the British army, and
such was the happy ignorance of the elements of strategy, that at a court-martial composed of general officers fo1· the trial of General Whitelock in 1808, for his
failul'e at Buenos Ayres, it was nece.--sary to explain to
the court what was meant in military phrm;e by the
"right bank" of a river.
I t is said again, by those who have the standard of
foreign armies before their eyes, that among our soldiers tbel'e is not a proper deference to rank, too much
camamdm·ie in short, and that this is fatal to <liscipline.
Ilut it should be remembered that mere formal disci* We ha,·e no room lo enumerate in detail the complaints made by the Duke
of the oAkers of his army. Those who are interested in tie subject mny consul}
Col. Gurwood's 4th volume, pages 343, 346'. ~52, 363, 381,399, and 407. The
whole •tory is summed up, however, in the genernl order occ,ision~d by the disorderly retreat from Burgos, in which the Duke said "that discipline had deteriorated during the campaign in a greater dcgt·ee than be had ever witnessed,
or ever read of in any army, and this, without any disaster, or any unusuul privation or hardship, that the officer, had from the first lost 1111 command over
their men, and that the true cause of this 11nhnppy state of nff11irs was to be
found in the habitual 11eglect of d,1ty by the Regi111e11tal Ojficen." This is the
army of which the Duke said later, tbnt "with it, he could go anywhere and
do anything," and, good or bad, it saved Eut·ope-in the English sense.
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pline may be one thing, and the true spirit of discipline
another, and yet both may answer the same purpose.
The first may be more showy than the latter, but not
more valuable to real military efficiency. Everything
depends upon the character of the soldier who is to be
goYerned by it. The British army is composed, as we
all know, of the refuse of the population, and in the
war in the Peninsula it was largely reinforced by the
introduction into its ranks of convicts taken from the
hulks, who were there expiating infamous offences.
With such men, motives based on a sense of duty were
powerless. Drunkenness, theft, marauding, a mutinous
spirit under privations, and a fierce thirst of license
which defied all control in the bom of victory, these
were the brutal passions which could only be checked
by the equally brute hand of force. But from such a
vile herd, made useful only as a slave is made useful,
by fear of the lash, to the civilized, sober, well educated
American citizen, animated with the consciousness that
he is fighting for a gre4t cause, in the success of which
he and his children ha,e a deep personal interest, and
who learns obedience because both his common sense
and bis sense of duty recognise its necessity, how immeasurable is the distance! The American volunteer,
in this respect, has not ~ad justice done to his excellence. .He is certainly a soldier essentially su,i generis,
and when we hear sneers at his -want of discipline, let
us remember that although he may not regard his officers as superior beings, yet experience has already
shown that in the cheerful performance of his new duties under pri\·ations; in his freedom from those vices
,vhich in many minds are inseparably associated with
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the very idea of a soldier; in his courage, endurance,
and steadiness in battle; and, more than all, in those
higher qualities which are the fruit of his education,
general intelligence, and love of country, he presents
himself to us as a figure hitherto wholly unknown in
military history.
One of the most cruel statements which party rancor has circulated in regard to the condition of the
army is, that the rate of sickness and mortality is excessive, and that this is due to the neglect of the
Government. Fortunately we have the means of showing that these statements are false. From June 1, 1861,
to :March 1, 1862-nine months-the annual rate of
mortality for the whole army is ascertained to be 53
in a thousand, and the sickness rate 104 in a thousand.
The returns for the summer campaigns are not yet
printed, but it will appear from them, that in the army
of the Potomac on the 10th of June, after the battle
of Fair Oaks, and w bile the army was encamped on
the Chickahominy, the whole number of sick, present
and absent, compared with the whole force of that
army, present and absent, was 128 in a thousand. During the stay of the army on the Peninsula it lost less
than 14,000 men by death, from disease and wounds, and
the annual sickness rate during the campaign was about
that which has for some time prevailed in the whole
army, less than ten per cent. of the whole force. It
appears, strange to say, that the army was more
healthy when in the trenches before Yorktown, than
at any other period of the campaign. Compare this
with the English experience. We have already said that
Wellington lost about one-third of his whole army from

•
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malarious fever on his retreat from Talavera: on the
1st of October, 1811, the Anglo-Portuguese army had
56,000 men fit for duty, and 23,000 sick in hospitals;
and in the Crimea, while the annual rate of mortality
for the whole war was 232 in a thousand, the period
of active operations, the last three months of 1854
and the first three months of 1855, shows the fearful
rate of 711 deaths in every thousand men.
It cannot be doubted that to many the most unfavorable symptom of our present condition is the slow
progress of our arms. This slowness is more apparnnt
than real, for the history of modern warfare scarcely
shows an instance in which so great real progress has
been made in the same space of time, and it is manifest that whenever our Northern soldiers have had a
chance of fighting the enemy on anything like equal
terms, they have fully maintained their superiority. It
is none the less true, howe\'er, that public expectation
in this matter bas been much disappointed, and it jg
curious to look at some of the explanations given for
it. The Prince de Joinville, in his recent pamphlet,
speaking of the battle of Fair Oaks, and of the neglect to throw bridges over the Cbickahominy at the
proper time, by means of which the whole rebel army
might have been taken in flank, and probably destroyed, ascribes the neglect on one page to what he
calls la l,entwr .A.mel'icaine, which he seems to think
always leads our countrymen to let the chance slip of
doing the right thing at the right time, and again on
the next to "jaute d, organisati'on, fa1tte de liim·m·chie,
du chef et
Jaute de lien, qid en 1·e-sulte entre l'
l' a1'1nee, lien pui8-sant pui permet ct im Genei·al de de-
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ma,nder' a 8e.s 8oldats et d' en obtenfr aveuglerneut cetJ
ejfoJ'{.9 extraordinaiNs qui r;agment le8 battailles." In
other word,, General McClellan, knowing that he could
gain a decisive victory by laying clown half a dozen
bridges, which, it is stated, were all ready for the purpose,
actually refused to order his soldiers to do it, because
he was afraid they would not obey his orders. And
this is the Prince's judgment of an army, which, a
few weeks later, according to his own account, fought
five b!lttles in as many clays, all, with one exception,
victories over an enemy at least double its numbers,
and arrived at its new base on the James River in
excellent condition, and without the slightest taint of
demoralization. This illustration shows the absurdity
of ascribing the want of immediate success to la lenteu1· Arnh·icaine, a quality, by the way, which we
learn for the first time, is one of our national characteristics.
Among the many causes which might be named, all
perfectly legitimate, and presenting no obstacle which
a little experience will not remo,·e, we venture to suggest but one, and that is the character of the early
military education of our higher officers. The system
pursued at West Point, although admirable for q ualifying officers for the scientific and staff corps of the
army, seems to fail in teaching the young soldier, what
is just now the most important quality he can possess
for command, the character and capacity of volunteer
soldier&. The system of discipline be has been taught
is that which governs the regular army, a system modelled upon the English, -..vhicb is, with the exception
of that in use in Russia, the most brutal and demor,tlizing known in any army in Europe. No wonder,
therefore, that when our educated soldiers are suddenly
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placed in high positions, and with great responsibilities,
and when they discover that the sort of discipline
which they have been taught is wholly out of place in
securing the efficiency of a volunteer army, they are
led to doubt whether it can ever be made efficient at
all. These prejudices, however, are wearing away before the test of actual experience. Generals are gradually learning that they may confide in their men, even
for desperate undertakings ; they begin to see in their
true light the many eminent qualities of the volunteer;
and he, in turn, begins to understand something of that
military system which seemed at first so irksome and
meaningless to him; and the advance of the army in
the essentials of discipline has been proportionably
rapid.
There is a good deal of talk about the impossibility
of conquering or subjugating the South, which is based
upon very vague notions of what conquest and subjugation signify. It is surprising to find how even int,elligent men have been imposed upon by this favorite
boast of the rebels and their sympathizers. A pretended saying of Napoleon is quoted, that '' it is impossible to prevent any people determined on achieving
its independence, from accomplishing its purpose;" and
it is confidently asked whether any one ever beard of
the subjugation of twelve millions of people determined
to be free. We reply, that history, ancient and modern, is foll of instances of the only sort of conquest or
subjugation which any sane man proposes shall be submitted to by the South. No one thinks it possible or
necessary, for the purpose in view, to occupy the whole
South with garrisons, but simply to destroy the only
support upon which its arrogant pretensions are based,
namely, its milita1·y power. This gone, what becomes

COXDUCT .A LOXG WAR.

3o

of all the rest? and this remaining, where is there any
hope of permanent peace and safety to us? For what
is all war, but an appeal to force to settle questions of
national interest which peaceful discussion has failed to
settle; and what is an army but only another argument, the 11ltirna mtio, which, if snr.rrssfnl in <lecisivP.
battles, must give the law to the conquered? To say
nothing of instances in ancient history, Poland, Hungary, and Lombardy, in our day, were just as determined to be free as the South is, aurl quite as full of
martial ardor; and certainly Prussia, Spain under the
Bonaparte dynasty, and the French Empire, are all examples of nations which valued their independence, and
had tenfold the resources for maintaining it which the
South possesses ; yet the capture of Warsaw, the surrender of Villagos, the battles of Novara, of Jena, of
Salamanca, aml of Waterloo, respectively, settled as
definiti,·ely the fo.te of the inhabitants of those countries, and their future condition, as if the terms imposed
by the conquering army had been freely and unanimously agreed upon by the representatives of the people in Congress assembled. And, in like manne1·, can
any one doubt, looking at the present comparative resomces of the two sections, that if we should gaiu two
decisive battles, one iu the East and the othe1· in the
vVest, which should result in the total disorganization
of the two rebel armies, and thus enable us to interpose an impassable haniel' betwf'en them, we should
soon hear a voice imploring in unrnista.kah1e accents
peace on our own terms? It would not he a matter
of choice, but of necessity; a simple question of how
far the progress of exhaustion had been carried, and
that once settled, and no reasonable hope of success
remaining, the war would not last a week longer. This
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is thC' experience of all nation.:;, and our Southern rebel",
notwithstanding theil' noisy honc:;ting, do not diffel' in
tlwi1· capacity of resistance from the rest of mankind.
"Ifonl pounding this, gentlemen," said the Duke of
·wellington to his officers, as he threw himself withiu
one of the unhroken "quare:-. of his heroic infantl'y at
,Yaterloo, "but we'll .<1ee wlto can pound the lon(!e-s·t ;"
and the ability of that infantry to" ponncl the longest"
on that day Rettled the fate of Eul'ope for generations.
Let us beml, then, onr unitecl energies to secure, aq
mnch as in ns lies, success in the fi.el1l, and that succe~,;
gainecl, we may be Rlll't• that all things will follow. Lt•t
us recognise with confMencc ns co•wo1·kel's in thi.-, great
object all, never mind what opinions they may enter•
tain nhout the can;;;<•s of the war and the new issnPs
which its progress hn;; developed, who de,;ire in all
sincerity, no matter from whnt motivt', the success of
our arms. Upon such a ln1--i-:, the wider and more
catholic our faith hecomes the bettel'. "In e,-,;entiah,,
Unity; in non-essential.:;, Liberty; in n11 thing;:i, Chal'i•
ty :" this f:houl<l be ou1· motto. The only pos;,ible hope
for the South is in our own divisions. Let us remembe1· that with success all things a1·e possible; without
it, all uur hopes ancl theories rnuish into thin air. "With
success in the field, we should not only <lisnrm the rebellion, and l'i<1 ou1·s<'h·e<; for <'Vet· of the pestil<>nt triho
of domestic traitor..; 1,y burying them cleep in that political ohli,·ion which co,·er,- the Tories of the ReYolu•
tion, ancl thosp wlrn Hnt>er<'<l at the gallant exploits o,
Ont' X:n-y in the wa1· of 1S1 ~, but a]so force puhlic
opinion abroad, who~c faithl<·ss11es, to the g1·cat prin•
ciple-, which unclcrlie all nHH1('rll civilization has been
one of the saddest developnwnts of this sad war, to
exclaim at last, "Invidiam glorirJ, 8upel'(1.8ti."

